Institutional Environments and Mode of Entry by Kinuma, Emile
i 
 













Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Master of Science (Administration) at 
Concordia University 
Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
 
 
March  2011 
 
 












This is to certify that the thesis prepared  
 
By: Emile Kinuma 
 
Entitled: Institutional Environments and Mode of Entry   
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
 
Master of Science (Administration) 
 
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with 




Signed by the final examining committee:  
 
                                                                     Marylène Gagné                        Chair  
                                                                                                                         
                                                                     Jisun Yu                                     Examiner  
              
                                                                     Rick Molz                                  Examiner  
 
                                                                     Mehdi Farashahi                        Supervisor  
 
 
Approved by                                  _Harjeet Bhabra_________________________ 
                                                       Chair of Department or Graduate Program Director 
 
  April 7
th
   2011__                        _Sanjay Sharma__________________________ 





Institutional Environments and Mode of Entry   
Emile Kinuma 
 
Mode of entry studies the international behavior of multinational firms and the 
factors that impact their international behavior. This study examines the impact the macro 
level institutions of a host country on the entry strategy of a foreign multinational 
enterprise (MNE). The framework developed in the study focuses on two sets of 
institutions, formal institutions which comprise the political and judicial rules and 
informal institutions which are comprised of cultural and business practices that are not 
formally codified. The results of the study provide further empirical evidence that the 
institutional environment influences MNE behavior. In particular this study found that, 
for a constant level of informality, the increased degree of formality of an institutional 
environment encourages multinational firms to choose acquisitions over joint ventures. 
Meanwhile the increased degree of formality and informality makes MNEs more likely to 




Acknowledgements and dedications page 
 
To the casual observer, a M.sc. thesis may appear to be solitary work. 
However, to complete a project of this magnitude requires a network of support, and I am 
indebted to many people. I am most especially grateful to my parents, Faustin and 
Bellancile Kinuma, and the Kinuma family for their guidance, support and extraordinary 
courage. I would also like to thank Professor Farashahi and the committee members for 



















Table of Contents 
 
List of Figures ……………….........................................................................................vii  
List of Tables....................................................................................................................viii  
Introduction......................................................................................................................1  
Chapter 1: Literature review.............................................................................................4  
Chapter 1.1: Transaction Cost Theory and Entry Mode Selection...................................4  
Chapter 1.2: Resource-based view and Entry Mode Selection.........................................5  
Chapter 1.3: Institutional Theory......................................................................................6  
Chapter 1.4.1: Institutional Theory and Entry Mode Selection........................................6  
Chapter 1.4.2: Institutional Theory and the Institutional Environment............................8  
Chapter 1.4.2.1: Formal Institutions..................................................................................9  
Chapter 1.4.2.1: Informal Institutions................................................................................9 
Chapter 1.5: Entry Mode Choices.....................................................................................10  
Chapter 1.5.1: Acquisition…............................................................................................10  
Chapter 1.5.2: Joint Venture.............................................................................................11 
Chapter 1.5.3: Strategic Alliance .....................................................................................11  
Chapter 1.4: Greenfield.....................................................................................................12  
Chapter 2: Theory and Hypotheses...................................................................................13  
Chapter 2.1: The Framework............................................................................................13  
Chapter 2.2: Main Assumptions ......................................................................................15  
Chapter 2.3: Institutional Environment and entry strategy...............................................16 
Chapter 3: Methodology...................................................................................................24 
vi  
 
Chapter 3.1: Sample.........................................................................................................24  
Chapter 3.2: Measures .....................................................................................................26  
Chapter 3.2.1: Dependent Variables ................................................................................28  
Chapter 3.2.2: Independent Variables...............................................................................29  
Chapter 3.2.2.1: Formal index .........................................................................................29  
Chapter 3.2.2.2: Informal index........................................................................................31  
Chapter 3.3: Data Analysis ..............................................................................................33  
Chapter 3.4: Results..........................................................................................................36  
Chapter 4: Discussion and Conclusion.............................................................................38  
Chapter 4.1: Discussion....................................................................................................38 
Chapter 4.2: Contribution.................................................................................................40   
Chapter 4.3: Limitations and Further Research................................................................41  






List of Figures 




List of Tables 
Table I Frequency of foreign entry strategies employed by the MNEs 
Table II Descriptive Statistics 
Table III Correlations between acquisition, JV, SA, Greenfield, FOI, IOF and DOT 
 







 The late Godfrey Binaisa, the former Ugandan president once joked that in Kampala “if 
your car travelled in a straight line you risked being arrested for drunken driving” (Holman, 
2010). At the time he was referring to the chaos that was all over the capital city of Uganda in 
the late 1970s. However his quote is very relevant when applied to the field of international 
management and more specifically when dealing with the foreign entry strategy of multinational 
firms. The proverbial car in the quote above can be thought of as a multinational firm and the 
manner in which it is driving the firm`s entry strategy. If the strategy is inadequate to the 
institutional context in which the multinational firm is operates in, the latter might be accused of 
“drunk driving” and suffer the consequences of such a behavior. 
 The field of international strategic management is broad and includes topics such as 
human resource management, internationalization; international joint ventures (Ricks et al., 
1990, p.220); foreign direct investment (FDI); strategic alliances and networks; organizational 
behavior, business-government relations and strategy to name a few (Werner, 2002, p.280). This 
thesis will focus on the topic of foreign entry-mode strategy-a topic which has received an 
important amount of attention by scholars and is the third most researched subject in 
international strategic management after the foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
internationalization fields of study (Werner, 2002). 
  The topic of foreign entry-mode strategy research focuses on the international behavior of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Ricks, 1991). As in any other branch of management, in 
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international management there are competing theories which seek to explain the mode of entry 
of firms in foreign countries. Canabal & White`s (2008) review of over 160 empirical studies on 
mode of entry decisions between 1980 and 2006 outlined the 10 most commonly used theories 
and constructs. The theories and constructs they found  are: Transaction cost theory, Resource-
based view, OLI/Location factors, Culture/cultural distance, Control, Internationalization, Risk, 
Institutional theory, Foreign direct investment, and Organizational/competitive capabilities. Most 
researchers on this topic have tended to focus on the characteristics of the proverbial car, that is 
the characteristics of the MNE in order to explain the international behavior of firms (Peng 
2003). Theories such as Transaction Cost (TC) and Resource-based view (RBV) (as the most 
cited in this literature) focus on MNE resources and capabilities (Meyer et al., 2008; Canabal & 
White, 2008). These theories assume a relatively stable environment and consider the 
institutional environment to be merely the background within which MNEs operate. Going back 
to the metaphor, these theories focus on the car and not on the fact that it is on the street in 
Kampala. Even when these theories focus on the contextual factors, they do not take into account 
the overall institutional framework of the country (Peng, 2003). There has been several 
consequences due to the limited amount of research on the characteristics of national institutional 
frameworks, one of them being lack of understanding the impact of these macro-level variables 
on the international behavior of firms (Meyer et al., 2008).  
However, there is a recent growing effort in research to understand how the 
characteristics of a host country‟s institutional framework affect mode of entry (Meyer et al., 
2008). This study will use the institutional perspective in an effort to further knowledge on the   
topic. Institutions regulate the economic activities within a country (North, 1990). Therefore the 
mode of entry chosen by an MNE can be viewed as a consequence of the influence of the 
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characteristics of the host country‟s institutions. With such a diversity of institutional 
frameworks in countries around the world (Peng, 2003), there is a need to better understand how 
these different characteristics affect the strategic choices of MNEs (Hitt et al., 2004). There are 
two main approaches to research on the impact of the institutional characteristics on MNE mode 
of entry. The first approach combines the institutional perspective with other theories, such as 
TC theory and RBV, to explain the international behavior of firms (Brouthers and Brouthers, 
2000; Yiu and Makino, 2002; Meyer et al., 2008). The second approach places a great emphasis 
on the formal characteristics of institutional frameworks (Delios and Beamish, 1999). This later 
approach intends to provide a more in depth analysis of the variations in institutional frameworks 
around the world, and provide empirical evidence for the possible impact of these variations on 
mode of entry.  
The purpose of this thesis is to study how the formal and informal characteristics of the 
host country`s institutional environment affect international behavior of an MNE (i.e. entry 
strategy). Among the theories mentioned above, transaction cost theory was by far the most 
commonly used theory in studying international entry modes (Canabal & White, 2008). 
Therefore, this study begins by explaining the key tenets of transaction cost theory, followed by 
resource-based view, outlining the entry modes favored by each theory and then introduce the 
institutional perspective. The study will then go over the entry mode choices covered in this 





1. Literature review 
1.1 Transaction Cost Theory and Entry Mode Selection 
 
“Research efforts in the area of international entry mode selection have tended to 
concentrate on transaction cost explanations” (Brouthers, 2002, p. 203). Transactions Cost 
Theory (TC) has its origins in the market imperfection thesis (Hymer, 1976). In TC theory the 
MNE is concerned with minimizing the cost of letting an external party take care of an operation 
versus internalizing it (Brouthers, 2002). The second objective is to maximize long term risk 
adjusted efficiency (Anderson &Gatignon, 1986). TC Theory relies on two assumptions namely 
bounded rationality and opportunism (Zhao et al., 2004). Transaction Cost Theory is a great tool 
for predicting “polar mode of entry” (2004). Polar modes of entry are the choice between 
markets and hierarchy (2004). Market mode of entry refers to non-equity mode of entry, such as 
strategic alliances, and hierarchy refers to equity modes of entry, such as acquisitions (2004). 
There are two factors that will influence entry mode according to TC theory: the degree of 
control the entry mode offers (Williamson, 1985) and the external context within which the entry 
strategy is implemented (Anderson and Gatignon, 1988).  When the external context is certain, 
and the MNE does not wish to exercise a high degree of control over the entry mode, the 
preferred mode of entry is Strategic Alliance (Williamson, 1979). The advantage of this mode of 
entry, characterized by low control, is that it allows the MNE to benefit from economies of scale 
in a market efficient environment (Williamson, 1985). In a context of high uncertainty, the MNE 
will more likely avoid ownership through low control modes like Strategic Alliance 
(Williamson, 1979). This gives certain level of flexibility to the firm and shifts risk to the other 
contracting party while taking advantage of the business opportunity in that environment 
(Williamson, 1979; Caves 1981). Researchers have pointed out, that in practice transaction cost 
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explanations can be impractical because it does not take into account the contextual grounding of 
human actions and, therefore, presents an under-socialized view of human motivation and an 
over-socialized view of institutional control (Goshal and Moran, 1985; Granovetter, 1985). The 
meta-analysis by Zhao et al. (2004) found that although the TC Theory was a powerful tool for 
explaining and predicting modes of entry, but it failed to predict the use of intermediate modes of 
entry such as joint ventures accurately.  
 
1.2 Resource-based view and Entry Mode Selection  
 
 Resource-based view (RBV) is also a major field of study dealing with entry modes 
(Canabal and White, 2008). Under RBV the main objective of the firm is to achieve a sustainable 
competitive advantage over its competitors (Barney, 1991). The MNE derives a sustainable 
competitive advantage by controlling “valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and not substitutable” 
resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991). The central idea of this view is that an MNE will 
choose the entry strategy that allows it to achieve the best fit between the MNE`s internal 
resources and external opportunities in order to create a sustainable competitive advantage 
(Connor, 1991). This perspective has the ability to explain the variations in the mode of entry 
used by MNE within the same industry (Ekeledo and Sivakumar, 2003). This theory identifies 
the firm as the source of competitive advantage rather than the industry in which it operates 
(Ekeledo and Sivakumar, 2003). The main assumption of the theory is that sole ownership is the 
default mode of entry which all firms would pursue (Stopford and Wells, 1972). There is 
evidence that sole ownership such as Greenfield/Acquisition is the preferred mode of entry by 
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US firms (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986) and that alliances such as Joint ventures are the 
second-best alternative by Japanese firms (Ouchi and Johnson, 1974; Hamel, 1991). 
The key takeaway from both theories is that when MNE expand internationally they seek 
for high control modes of entry (Stopford and Wells, 1972) that are cost effective (Anderson & 
Gatignon, 1986). Despite the strong explanatory power of TC and Resource-based theories in 
interpreting the international behavior of MNEs, more contextual factors - such as cultural and 
institutional explanations - should be added to both these economic explanations to better 
analyze a firm‟s entry mode selection (Brouthers, 2002).  
 
1.3 Institutional theory 
1.3.1Institutional Theory and Entry Mode Selection 
 
Institutions determine “the rules of the game” and help to reduce uncertainty within an 
economy in which an MNE operates (North, 1990, p.3).  Institutional theory states that for firms 
to enter a given economy they must comply with the rules, regulations and beliefs of a given 
institutional environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Xu and Shenkar, 2002). Institutional 
Theory attempts to explain the effect that institutions have on organizations (Zucker, 1983; Davis 
et al., 2000) and in our case, the effect of these institutions on the modes of entry that firms 
select. This theory is appealing because it emphasizes contextual factors influencing entry mode 
decisions (Yiu & Makino, 2002) and draws attention to non-market pressures (Davis et al., 2000; 
Oliver, 1991, Rodriguez, 2005). There are a variety of institutions; however they can be 
regrouped into two broad characteristics which include “formal rules (laws, regulations) and 
informal constraints (customs, norms, cultures)” (Peng, 2003, p.277).  
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The key tenet of Institutional Theory is the concept of “Institutional Isomorphism” (Xu 
and Shenkar, 2002, p.609). Indeed, in Institutional Theory there is a general understanding that 
for organizations to survive and operate normally within a specific institutional environment they 
must “conform to the rules and belief systems prevailing in the environment” (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Xu and Shenkar, 2002). The fact that firms conform to the pressures exerted by 
the institutional environment is called “institutional isomorphism”, which allows the firm to 
obtain legitimacy (Xu and Shenkar, 2002). Kostova and Zaheer (1999) define “organizational 
legitimacy as the acceptance of the organization by its environment”.  
 
1.3.2 Institutional theory and defining the Institutional Environment 
 
For the purpose of this paper institutional environment is defined as “the elaboration of 
rules and requirements to which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive 
support and legitimacy (Scott and Meyer 1983, p.149)”. North (1990) like most scholars 
acknowledges the impact of institutions on firms` behavior and classifies institutions into formal 
and informal institutions (North, 1990; Peng, 2003; Peng et al., 2008). He sees informal and 
formal institutions as being the opposite ends of the same spectrum and believes that as societies 
become more complex they move from informal institutions to more formal types of institutions 
to increase their specialization and division of labor (North, 1990). In the following lines both 
types of institutions will be defined before explaining the theoretical basis upon which the 
hypotheses are developed. Throughout this study, the institutions that are used to define the 
institutional environment of a country are macro-level market supportive institutions (i.e. Formal 
and Informal) unless otherwise specified. 
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1.3.2.1 Formal Institutions 
 
Formal institutions include political (and judicial) rules, economic rules and contracts 
(North, 1990). These formal institutions are usually characterized by a state or government. 
These formal institutions for instance regulate the economic activity in a particular country and 
will influence the behavior of firms operating in within the country (North, 1990). In addition to 
North`s insight this study will consider formal institutions as “the legal framework and its 
enforcement, property rights, information systems, and regulatory regimes” (Meyer, Estrin, 
Bhaumik and Peng, 2008, p. 63).  
 
1.3.2.2 Informal Institutions 
 
Informal institutions are everywhere; they are present in both formal and informal 
societies (North, 1990). North asserts that even in societies where formal institutions are quite 
important for instance in the Triad region (North America, the European Union and Japan) 
(Rugman and Verbeke, 2004), informal institutions make up a significant portion of the 
institutional environment (1990). Informal institutions are “socially transmitted information and 
are part of the heritage that we call culture (North, 1990, p.37)”.  Informal institutions are the 
social and moral norms other than formal institutions that structure human interaction, and by 
extension, how multinational firms are to enter and operate in a given environment in addition to 
the influence of formal institutions (1990). Countries that have been popularly called emerging 
economies or transition economies have a high degree of informal institutions in the institutional 
landscape (Peng, 2003). The focus of this study is on informal institutions that are business 
supportive.  These informal institutions, for instance, focus on “personal relationships and other 
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social connections that promote values such as mutual respect and mutual benefit” needed to 
carry out business and give a firm legitimacy in an institutional environment (Buckley et al., 
2007, p.506). These informal institutions usually serve as ways to compensate for the lack of 
market supportive formal institutions (2007). 
 
1. 4 Entry Mode Choices 
 
 This study covers the four most common entry strategies: Acquisition, Strategic Alliance (SA), 
Joint Venture (JV), and Greenfield (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992). Each of these four entry strategies 
has different objectives with respect to access to local resources and prerequisites for their 
implementation (Meyer et al., 2008) 
 
1.4.1 Acquisition  
 
The three characteristics needed for an acquisition to be considered as an entry strategy 
are (Yip, 1982): 
1. An intention to use the acquired business as a base for expansion in the new market;  
2. A desire to exploit relatedness/synergy between the acquired business and other 
parent businesses;  
3. An interest in the market, and not just in the acquired business, i.e., the acquiring 
company would have seriously considered entering directly (Yip, 1982, p.332). 
Acquisition is used as a mode of entry to gain access to resources held by the acquired 
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firm in a foreign country (Meyer et al., 2008). In order to benefit from the resources held by a 
foreign firm using acquisitions, an MNE relies on the efficiency of the host country‟s resources 
market (2008). The efficiency of financial markets is another condition for the acquisition 
strategy to be a viable option for MNEs. An MNE needs to be able to access financial market, 
which require “transparency, predictability and contract enforcement mechanisms” (2008, p. 64). 
In acquiring a local firm an MNE can mitigate risk of retaliation from local competitors because 
as Brouthers (2000) points out, the overall capacity of the host economy is still the same.  
 
1.4.2 Strategic Alliances  
 
Strategic alliance is an agreement signed by two or more partners to engage in long or 
short term business activities that will be mutually beneficial (Tsang, 1998). Tsang (1998) 
identifies the following agreements as strategic alliances:  R&D coalitions, marketing and 
distribution agreements, franchising, co-production agreements, management agreements, 
licensing, consortiums, and Joint Ventures (Tsang, 1998). Mergers and acquisitions are excluded 
from this definition. In addition, strategic alliances will be differentiated depending on whether 
some type of equity is involved in the alliances (JV vs. Managements agreements) (Dalcin et al., 
2007). The reason for differentiating joint venture as a particular entry strategy is that it 
highlights the impact of non-market pressures, “that may induce firms to trade their ownership 
for legitimacy in the local environment” (Yiu and Makino, 2002, p.668). 
 




Joint Venture involves the creation of a new entity by two different firms (Dacin et al., 
2007). Although Joint Ventures and Acquisitions are similar in the sense that they are the 
conscientious effort of one firm trying to access resources held by another firm, they differ in the 
degree of ownership which in a JV is usually evenly shared among the participating firms 
(Meyer et al. 2008). Equity in Joint Venture is used by the parties involved as a control 
mechanism (Xu and Shenkar, 2002). 
 
1.4.4 Greenfield  
 
The last foreign entry strategy covered in the paper is the Greenfield mode of entry. 
When firms decide to enter a market they have to decide upon the level of control which they 
wish to have in their new venture (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). When the MNE wants to 
have full control and decides to build a new plant it will go with what is called a Greenfield 
investment (Hennart and Park, 1993). 
The benefits of a Greenfield investment according Hennart and Park (2003) are: 
1. It reduces the dissemination of firm specific advantages   
2. It allows the firm to deploy an MNE`s resources such as company policies and 
corporate culture without having to impose upon existing personnel. 
An MNE that opts for a Greenfield mode of entry maintains its internal consistency, and 
is less concerned by pressures to conform stemming from the external environment (Hennart and 
Park, 1993). There are a few cases where a Greenfield investment will yield the most benefits for 
the MNE: the first case is a fast growing market where the new venture would have enough 
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capacity to expand (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). The second case is when market supportive 
institutions are weak - that is, when there is high uncertainty in the market.  
 
2.  Theoretical Framework 
2.1 The Framework 
 
The key question this thesis intends to answer is: “How does the degree of formality and 
informality of a particular institutional environment affect the entry strategy of an MNE?” 
To address this question one needs to have a clear understanding of the formality and 
informality levels of host countries' institutional environments. Then, the variation of entry 
strategies with respect to various levels of formality and informality can explain the impact of 
host country institutional environment on MNEs' entry strategies. In this study, entry strategies 
are summarized in four categories as fully-owned operations through Acquisition or Greenfield, 
equity Joint Venture, and Strategic Alliance. 
This study proposes a framework that seeks to predict the entry strategy of firms based on 
the relative influence exerted by either formal or informal institutions at the national level 
(North, 1990) and the empirical evidences provided by TC theory and Resource-based view. It 
also intends to consider market supportive (Peng, 2003) formal and informal institutions in order 
to define the institutional environment.  
The host country`s institutions whether formal or informal have an essential role in a 
market economy; they can either support the effective functioning of the market mechanism or 
hinder it (North, 1990; Peng, 2009). In the suggested theoretical framework the impact of 
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institutions is such that firms and individuals can engage in market transactions without incurring 
undue costs or risks (North, 1990; Peng, 2009).  
Formal institutions include, for the purpose of this study, the legal framework and its 
enforcement, property rights, information systems, and regulatory regimes. Institutional 
arrangements are considered to be exerting a relatively high degree of influence if they support 
the “voluntary exchange underpinning an effective market mechanism” (Meyer et al., 2008, p.7). 
On the other hand if the formal institutions fail to ensure effective markets or even 
undermine markets, they will be considered as exerting a relatively low degree of influence. For 
instance when the regulatory regime of a host country is not business friendly or the bureaucracy 
of the host country`s government is characterized by too much red tape, effectively undermining 
the effective working of the market mechanism, those institutions are referred to as exerting a 
relatively low degree of influence (Meyer et al., 2008). In the same vein informal institutions that 
exert a relatively high degree of influence are considered to be market supportive and conversely 
informal institutions that exert relatively low degree of influence are considered to be market 
„disruptive‟ (2008). In countries  where formal institutions are well developed and are exerting 
relatively high degree of influences like in the United States , “their role, though critical, may be 
almost invisible” (Meyer et al., 2008, p.63). In contrast, when there is markets malfunction, as in 
some emerging economies like China, the absence of market supportive formal institutions is 
„conspicuous‟ (MacMillan, 2007; Meyer et al., 2008).  
The two characteristics –formal and informal– of an institutional framework can be 
summarized in a two dimensional matrix. The matrix developed in this study seeks to capture the 
entire contextual environment by separating it into two sets of institutions: formal institutions 
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and informal institutions (North, 1990). In addition to capturing the context, this study also takes 
into account the quest of internal and external legitimacy by multinational firms (Rosenzweig & 
Singh, 1991). 
 
2.1 Main Assumptions 
 
This study will rely on a two dimensional framework similar to that of Rodriguez et al. 
(Rodriguez et al., 2005). Rodriguez et al. attempt to single out government corruption as an 
essential element of the external environment (2005). They use corruption not only to 
differentiate various environments but also to predict firms` behavior (2005). They devised a two 
dimensional framework that seeks to explain the entry strategy of firms based on the “pervasive” 
(the average firm‟s likelihood of encountering corruption with state officials) or “arbitrary” (the 
degree of uncertainty related to corruption) nature of corruption (2005, p.385).  The problem is 
that it only focuses on government corruption and fails to take into account other contextual 
macro-level variables in order to predict firms` behavior (2005). This study acknowledges the 
fact that there are other elements in every environment and separates them into sets of formal and 
informal institutions. However, this study focuses on the degree of influence that each set of 
institutions might have on the entry strategy of an MNE.  This study seeks to complement the 
work of Rodriguez et al. by increasing the scope of institutions that are involved in determining 
legitimacy and influencing firms` behavior. 
This study recognizes the fact that MNEs face “dual pressures of conformity”, one 
originating within the firm itself and that of the host country`s institutional environment (Yiu and 
Makino, 2002, p.668). This paper will, however, assume that the pressures to conform within 
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organizations (i.e. internal legitimacy) are constant across all the MNEs. This is done so that in 
the case where the host country`s institutional environment`s influence on the MNE entry mode 
is negligible, the internal consistency of the MNE will become the determinant factor in the 
MNE`s selection of the appropriate mode of entry (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). In other words, 
should the degree of influence of the institutional be weak; the MNE will choose the entry 
strategy that favors its internal consistency (1999). This is the case in countries such as Somalia, 
which characterized by an institutional vacuum in which the notion of a centralized government 
is being contested by family clans which compete for the control of resources (Baker, 1999). In 
this context of low general institutional influence (International institutions, and industry 
influences being held constant) and increased uncertainty, MNE`s need to develop trust with the 
host country`s population by having an internal story that is consistent (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). 
Therefore firms operating in such institutional environments will be more influenced by the 
pressure to conform from within the organization than those originating from the external 
environment (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994).  
 
2.3 The Institutional environment and entry strategy   
 
The institutional environment of the host country is modeled by a two dimensional 
framework. The first dimension represents the degree of influence that formal institutions can 
have on the entry strategy of MNEs. The second dimension represents the influence stemming 
from informal institutions and the possible impact it has on the mode of entry of MNEs. Figure 1 
summarizes the different environments that exist by only taking into account the degree of 
influence that formal and informal institutions can have on an MNE`s behavior. The Y axis 
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represents the degree of influence exerted by informal institutions present in the environment. 
The X axis represents the degree of influence exerted by formal institutions in the institutional 
environment.  
Generally MNEs compared to the host country`s firms are under “discriminative 
institutional pressure” from the host country`s national government (Poynter, 1985; Yiu and 
Makino, 2002, p.670). In order to overcome the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995), an MNE 
will choose an entry strategy that will allow it to deal best with the isomorphic pressures 
originating from institutional environment of the host country which it operates in (Di Maggio 
and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995; Yiu and Makino, 2002). 
This first institutional environment covered in this framework is characterized by a 
predominance of the influence of formal institutions on MNE behavior compared to informal 
institutions. This means that the degree of influence exerted by formal institutions is higher 
relatively speaking than that exerted by informal institutions. Formal institutions, according to 
North, regulate the economic activity in a particular country and will influence the behavior of 
firms operating within it (North, 1990). In this quadrant, formal institutions are expected to have 
a high degree of influence through mechanisms to reinforce contracts, functioning courts and 
government policies (North, 1990). The foreign entry mode of firms must conform to “the 
regulatory domain of the host country” in order to obtain legitimacy (Yiu and Makino, 2002, 
p.670). However as Meyer et al. (2008) pointed out “where institutions are strong in developed 
economies, their role, though critical, may be almost invisible (Meyer et al., 2008 p. 63)”. Indeed 
in this institutional environment formal institutions ensure the market functions well and their 
impacts are less visible than those of market forces (Meyer et al., 2008). An example of such an 
entry is the case of Tata Group. Indeed, in 2009 India`s largest conglomerate purchased two car 
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manufacturing companies (Jaguar and Land Rover) from Ford (Leahy, 2009). 
 
Figure I 
Impact of institutional environments on entry modes 
 
Under conditions of institutional certainty like the ones described here, TC theory asserts 
that an MNE would have the option of choosing a strategic alliance or an acquisition as a mode 
of entry. The logic behind that is that as institutional environments become more and more 
formal the cost of doing business in that environment also decreases (Estrin, 2002) The 
18  
 
institutional environment in this case provides the certainty that MNEs seek in order to establish 
contacts which will be enforced by function contract enforcement mechanisms (Anderson & 
Gatignon, 1986).  However, with respect to issues of the degree of control over resources, RBV 
favors sole ownership type of entry modes. In a stable environment an Acquisition is preferable 
to a Greenfield because it allows the MNE to expand by accessing resources and knowledge 
previously held by the firm that the MNE whishes to acquire (Meyer et al., 2008). The second 
advantage with acquisition is that the expansion is done without changing the overall capacity of 
the host country (Brouthers, 2000). This helps the MNE to overcome the liability of foreignness 
(Zaheer, 1995), and mitigate the threat of retaliation from local competitors (Brouthers, 2000). 
It is therefore hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 1: All things remaining equal, firms are more likely to choose acquisition 
over other modes of entry when entering a host country where its formal institutions are highly 
influential as opposed to its informal institutions. 
 
The second institutional environment covered by the framework is characterized by the 
predominance of informal and formal institutions in that environment. This means the 
isomorphic influence exerted by both informal and formal institutions on the behavior of the firm 
are relatively high.  
Peng in his article coins the terms “transition economies” to talk about the economies that 
are experiencing great changes in their formal and informal institutional environments as they 
transition from planned to market economies (Peng, 2003, p.277). Peng identifies two phases in 
the institutional transition from planned to market economies (Peng, 2003).  Countries in the 
19  
 
early phase are at the beginning of the institutional transition and countries in the second phase 
are well advanced in the transition and have significantly changed their institutional environment 
(2003). The second institutional environment covered in the study describes the countries in the 
late phase of the transition such as China (Peng, 2003).  
In recent years China has made tremendous efforts to liberalize its economy by giving 
itself strong formal institution to regulate its economy, but as it shifted from a planned economy 
to a market economy it resulted in massive market failures (Peng, 2000). For example, during the 
1980s,  the Chinese government required firms wishing to enter China to set up a joint venture 
with a local partner in accordance with the Joint Venture  laws of 1979 (Beamish and Wang, 
1989). Indeed, as Luo (2000b) points out China has privileged a slower transition of its 
institutional landscape towards a more “market friendly” institutional landscape. China 
developed an array of policies aimed at rewarding partnerships that allowed local firms to gain 
access to technical knowledge needed for its development. (UNCTAD, 2005, Luo 2000b, Hitt et 
al., 2004). These efforts in countries such as China have favored the development of stable and 
market supportive formal institutions (Hitt et al., 2004). However, the Chinese government has 
exercised a tight control of its financial system in order to avoid instability (2004). This tight 
control of the financial system has had the consequence of having market inefficiencies (2004). 
In order to deal with these failures, businesses have relied on informal institutions to mitigate the 
negative effects of those market inefficiencies (Rose, 2000). In the case of China the informal 
institution that helped mitigate those inefficiencies is “guanxi (the ancient system of personal 
relationships and social connections based on mutual interest and benefit) in Chinese business 
dealings” (Buckley et al., 2007, p.506). In emerging economies where formal institutions are 
strong there will be an increase in the equity mode of entry in the form of acquisitions and 
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foreign direct investment (Meyer et al., 2008). An example of this case is India when it started 
engaging in the strengthening of its formal institutions in 1991 (Peng et al., 2008). The 
consequence has been the gradual increase in foreign direct investment and acquisitions in recent 
years (Peng et al., 2008).  
In such an institutional environment there are formal constraints placed on the level of 
equity ownership or on the access of key resources, which limit the possibility of an MNE to 
choose either Acquisition or Greenfield as modes of entry (Delios and Beamish, 1999). The high 
degree of influence of informal institutions also puts the MNE at a disadvantage compared to 
local firms (Peng, 2003). For instance, knowing when bribery is acceptable can significantly 
lower the cost of doing business (Meyer, 2001). Joint venture is an interesting mode of entry, 
since it reduces the information asymmetry present in that environment by gaining useful insight 
about the business practices from the local partner (Meyer, 2001). In addition to the example just 
provided JV gives the MNE access to local resources which other types of strategic alliances 
cannot access in a cost efficient manner (Meyer et al., 2008). Finally, the MNE may choose to 
trade full ownership with partial ownership for legitimacy in the local environment (Yiu and 
Makino, 2002). 
The hypothesis that can be made about the firm entry strategy in the institutional 
environment described above is the following: 
Hypothesis 2: All things remaining equal, firms are more likely to choose equity joint 
venture over other modes of entry when entering a host country where both formal and informal 




The third institutional environment outlined in this study is characterized by a relatively 
high degree of influence of informal and a relatively low degree of influence of formal 
institutions in that environment. Countries typical of this institutional environment are countries 
from Africa, the Middle East and Central Europe; generally, these countries have received little 
attention from research (Hoskisson et al., 2000). However, Peng states that these countries are at 
the early stage of economic transition (2003). Indeed, the first stage is the early phase of 
economic transition; in this stage, firms put most of their efforts into establishing ties with local 
businesspeople which is a time and resource consuming process (Peng, 2003). The institutional 
chaos that emerged in the 1990s in Russia from the decentralization and the subsequent 
immediate opening of its national market led to massive market failures (Ledvena 1998, Luo 
2000a, Hitt et al., 2004). These failures have led the business culture of the country to be 
characterized by what is referred to as blat, a system of relationships through which business is 
carried out, and increased corruption in order to palliate for the lack of formal market supportive 
institutions (Ledvena 1998, Luo 2000a, Hitt et al., 2004). In order to take advantage of the 
business opportunities available in these countries, MNEs must take into account the heightened 
uncertainty, and therefore higher level of risk associated with doing business in these countries 
(Peng, 2003). Multinational firms that choose to enter these markets need to minimize the risk of 
doing business in that environment (Delios and Beamish, 1999) and by the same token increase 
their overall legitimacy in the host country`s institutional environment (Dacin et al., 2007).  
The weak influence of formal institutions in these cases limits the choice of an 
Acquisition, a mode of entry which is particularly sensitive to the degree of formality within an 
institutional environment (Meyer et al., 2008). An important characteristic of the third 
institutional environment, defined in this paper, is the high corruption and uncertainty present in 
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such environments (Peng, 2003). This raises significantly the cost of doing business in such 
environment, and discourages firms from selecting entry modes which require full ownership 
(Williamson, 1979). Indeed, many of the transactions done in such an institutional environment 
must rely on the trustworthiness of the local partner (Ledvena 1998, Luo 2000a, Hitt et al., 
2004). However this problem is worsened by the general lack of institutions that help mitigate 
the lack of information about the business environment (Meyer et al., 2008). Therefore MNEs 
will prefer Strategic Alliance over JV, in order to take advantage of the business opportunities in 
that institutional environment (Williamson, 1979; Caves 1981). This will not only allow the 
MNE to remain flexible, but also shift more risk onto the local partner (Williamson, 1979; Caves 
1981).     
It can therefore be hypothesized that: 
 Hypothesis 3: All things remaining equal, firms are more likely to choose 
strategic alliances over other modes of entry when entering a host country where informal 
institutions are highly influential as opposed to its formal institutions. 
 
 The final institutional environment is characterized by a low degree of influence of both 
formal and informal institutions. Basically in this institutional environment the national influence 
of institutions that seek to promote and develop business is negligible. Research on this issue is 
relatively nonexistent in the management literature (Hoskisson et al., 2000). However, 
researchers in political science define these institutional environments by the term “failed states” 
(Reno, 1997). 
 A failed state is a nation that is: “utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the 
23  
 
international community” (Helman and Ratner, 1996, p.12). It is also a nation that has significant 
internal challenges to its political order (Olson, 1993). Examples of such failed states are present 
day Somalia and Libya. This phenomenon of failed states is quite recent - it started with the end 
of the Cold War - and many of these states do not disappear (Dorff, 1996). 
One interesting insight that Reno (1997), in studying failed states and commercial 
alliances, has made concerning firms operating in such environment is that usually firms that 
wish to expand in those states have wholly owned subsidiaries operating there (Reno, 1997). 
Indeed, most firms operating in such areas are focused on extraction of raw materials (1997). 
The companies operating in these areas are usually invited by the ruler who controls the regions 
where these minerals or oil deposits are found (1997). Reno (1997) asserts that in order to 
operate in such an environment these firms must rely on the services of mercenaries to protect 
their investments (1997). The example that Reno uses is the example of South African mining 
firms operating in former Zaire now the Democratic Republic of Congo which relied on the 
services of private military companies also to ensure the security of both its personnel and its site 
of production (1997). 
In this institutional environment, there is neither state nor government to provide the 
minimum contract enforcement requirements for MNEs to protect their interest without incurring 
prohibitive costs (Helman and Ratner, 1996). The only viable entry strategy in this case is 
Greenfield investment (Reno, 1997). Transaction cost solutions such as Strategic Alliance or 
Acquisition require the use of existing structures by MNEs to expand (Madhok, 1997). The main 
advantage of this mode of entry is that it allows the MNE to access external resources and 
opportunities in that environment directly to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991).  This entry mode also allows the firm to deploy its resources without imposing 
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(i.e. culture) or sharing them (i.e. financial resources) with another firm (Hennart and Park, 
1993). The hypothesis regarding the mode of entry into this fourth institutional environment is 
the following: 
Hypothesis 4: All things remaining equal, as the influence of both informal and formal 
institutions become less and less relevant firms will choose a Greenfield Investment mode of 
entry over other forms of entry strategies.  
 
3.  Methodology 
3.1 Sample 
 
To test the hypotheses made in the previous section a period of five years (1998-2003) is 
chosen to get as many different countries as possible represented in the dataset. This is also done 
to get a significant amount of transaction for entry strategy. The year 2001 is chosen as a 
benchmark to see more variation in terms of the variables needed for the study.  
The population of interest in this study is MNEs that have entered foreign markets using 
one of the four foreign strategies outlined earlier in the paper. The sample that is used in the 
study comes from the Thomson Reuters`s database called SDC Platinum (SDC Platinum, 2010). 
It is a financial database that records global financial transactions (e.g. Mergers and Acquisitions, 
Bond issues) (Thomson Reuters, 2010). The selected sample lists all the transactions between 
MNEs of the bottled and canned soft drinks and the carbonated drinks industry with the Standard 
Industrial Classification number 2086 between 1998 and 2003. The reason why this industry is 
chosen is because it produces very standardized products which require only minimal adaptation 
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of their product to local markets. This is done in order to isolate the impact the institutional 
environment has on a firm`s behavior.  
The data retrieved from the SDC lists 213 transactions in 43 countries that are considered 
to be foreign entry strategies, meaning that an MNE with the 2086 SIC code is employing one of 
the four foreign strategies explained in the previous lines. 
The 43 countries represented in the sample have considerable variations when it comes to 
their institutional environments; for example, 14 of the countries are from the EU, Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, as well as South Africa, Canada and the United States are among the list.  
There are 60 companies represented in the sample which originate from 17 countries of 
the high income OECD. Theses 60 MNEs are listed in appendix 2, along with the entry strategies 
they used. This study limits the scope of origin of the MNEs to those of the OECD, because 
firms originating from developed economies have different objectives for their expansion 
compared to those originating from transition economies (Peng and Heath, 1996). The study will 
also focus exclusively on firms originating from the high income countries of the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) so that they all have one common 
objective in their foreign expansion which is growth (Peng and Heath, 1996).  
For a complete list of the countries that were used in this study please refer to Appendix 1 at the 














For the data concerning the measure of institutional environment of the countries in the 
sample, the paper relies on historical data provided by the World Bank website: The World 
Governance Indicators (WGI) from 2001 (World Bank, 2010). WGI tries to measure the 
governance perception in over 200 countries from 31 different data sources (Kaufmann et al., 
2010). These indicators have been used in the field of econometrics and economic development 
to measure the impact of institutions on economic growth (Durlauf et al. 2005) the flow of FDI 
(Helpman, 2006). The paper also relies on the index on Property Rights in 2001developed by the 
Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal (Heritage, 2010). In addition to the WGI this 
paper also relied on the World Economic Forum`s 2001 World Competitiveness Report (WEF, 
2001) Report and on the measure of the size of the Informal Economy of 110 countries in 2001 
(Schneider, 2002). This measure has been used in the measurement of informal economies in 
mega-cities (Daniels, 2004). All the items used to measure the Institutional environment have 
been rescaled so that they become a percentile. The scale of the original data was reversed so that 
a higher score in the study represents greater influence being exerted by Informal Institutions and 
a lower score represents lower influence being exerted by Informal Institutions. The scales of 
each item measuring the degree of influence being exerted by Formal Institutions have been kept 
as is. The objective behind these modifications is to facilitate the analysis of the data. For 
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example in the case of formal institutions, a higher score will be interpreted as a higher degree of 
influence being exerted by formal institutions. 
 
3.2 Measures 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
 
The dependent variable that is used in our study is a categorical one and represents the 4 
types of entry strategies used by the MNEs to enter a foreign market. Three regressions were 
conducted to better understand the possible impact the institutional environment of a host 
country might have on the entry strategy of an MNE by comparing the likelihood of choosing a 
particular entry strategy compared to the reference entry strategy.  
The classification of the entry modes is based on the classification provided by the 
database in most cases. The cases where we have Greenfield strategies as a mode of entry are 
found in the Joint Venture data of SDC; in this paper, Joint ventures are considered to be 
Greenfield strategies if two companies engage in equity joint venture to set up production 
facilities in a another country. This paper considers the operation as a Greenfield foreign mode of 
entry undertaken by both firms jointly. The main reason behind this decision is that the 
institution environment will impact the new entity as whole, and not the different firms that 
partake in the joint venture independently. The distinction between Acquisition and Joint 
Venture is a bit more problematic. Researchers in the field have come across the same problem 
(Yiu and Makino, 2002). In this paper we have adopted the cutoff point provided by the 
database: 80% which is in line with conventional accounting practices. Given that the values 
come from a finance database, this cut off point is particularly salient (Makino and Beamish, 
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1998). Researchers are split on the issue; previous studies established the cutoff at 95% 
(Anderson and Gatignon 1986; Gomes-Casseres 1989; Hennart 1991; Padmanabhan and Cho 
1996; Yiu and Makino 2002). 
 
3.2.2 Independent Variables 
 
3.2.2.1 Formal Institutions 
 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2004) managed to identify two sets of formal institutions that 
capture the essence of market-oriented formal institutions: “property rights and contracting 
institutions (specialized intermediaries, contracting-enforcing mechanism, and regulatory 
systems that allow the firm to operate freely within a host country)” (p.955)The website of the 
World Bank defines Governance as: “Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by 
which authority in a country is exercised” (World Bank, 2010). This definition encapsulates the 
two sets of institutions pointed out by Acemoglu and Johnson (2004), in addition to highlighting 
the central role that national governments play in defining the national Institutional environment 
in general. 
To be able to measure to what extent MNE`s are being influenced by the Institutional 
environment the paper proxies the strength of market-supporting institutions by three items of 
the World Governance Indicators developed by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2007). The 
three dimensions that are considered for the purpose of this paper are the following Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, and Rule of Law (Kaufmann et al., 2007). The last item used 
to measure the influence of Formal Institutions on the independent variable is the Property 
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Rights index developed by the Heritage Foundation (Heritage, 2010). 
Government Effectiveness GE: This variable focuses on the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political influences, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies (Kaufmann et al., 2007).   
Regulatory Quality RQ: This variable captures the perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development (Kaufmann et al., 2007). 
Rule of Law RL: This variable captures the perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence (Kaufmann et al., 2007). 
Property Rights PR: This variable is taken from the Heritage Foundation. According to 
the Heritage website the index captures the perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens 
are able to access property and accumulate property (Heritage, 2010). It measures the degree to 
which the laws of the country protect private property and the degree to which the government 
enforces those laws. This index is salient to the study because it proxies a market-supporting 
institution. 
 From the four dimensions an index is computed called Formal which is the average of 
the four indices and will represent the degree of influence of formal institutions within an 
institutional environment. With the use of this average this study seeks to better understand the 





3.2.2.1 Informal Institutions 
 
Finding proxies to represent the degree of influence which informal institutions exert 
upon the international behavior of MNEs is a real challenge (Helmke and Levitsky, 2009). 
Indeed there is a lack in the literature of theoretical model representing informal institutions due 
to the fact that it is hard to measure (Helmke and Levitsky, 2009). After reviewing the literature 
the following proxies were identified as modeling market supportive informal institutions : the 
size of the informal economy as a percentage of a given country`s GDP (Shneider 2002), the 
corruption perception index of a country (WGI), the  Sophistication of Business Culture( World 
Competitive Report, 2001)  and finally Political stability, which is also a key measure when 
dealing with informal institutions that affect the mode of entry strategy of a multinational firm 
(WGI, 2010, p.20). 
Corruption Perception Index CC: Tanzi defines corruption as the abuse of public power 
for private benefit (Tanzi, 1998). The level of corruption of a particular country can alter the 
entry strategy of an MNE (Rodriguez et al., 2002). Measuring corruption just like measuring the 
size of the informal economy is not easy either (Rodriguez et al., 2002). The paper however uses 
the CPI devised by World Governance Indicators which measures “the perceptions of the extent 
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests” (Kaufmann et al., 
2010, p.11).  
Political Stability PS: This item measures the extent to which the government of a 
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country is like to be overthrown by unconstitutional means including violence (Kaufmann, 
2002). The relevance of this measure in this section of the study comes from the fact that if a 
country is highly unstable, this means that the laws are no longer being enforced properly by the 
government and that Informal Institutions become relevant in such an Environment.  
 Sophistication of Business Culture BC: The sophistication of business culture is measured 
by the Global Competitive Index GCI (WCR, 2000). Traditionally researchers have tended to use 
cultural distance as a variable in order to measure the impact of culture in the MNE`s entry 
strategy decision (Harzing, 2004). In this study a broader view of the impact that culture has on 
the impact of the entry strategy is needed. The Global Competitive index offers the kind of 
required breadth which this study is seeking. In essence, the study is looking for the business 
culture of the host country and how its sophistication impacts the behavior of the firm. Cultural 
Influences which is the combination of Cultural distance and Ethnocentricity according to Yiu 
and Makino (2002), should also include the relationship-based institutions like guanxi in China 
which are part of their Informal Institutions and an essential component of their business 
practices (Hitt et al., 2004). It is believed in this study that with the GCI these aspects are 
included in the measure (WCR, 2000). The Global Competitive Index ranks countries from 1 to 
57; in order to use the rankings we rescaled the rankings to assign them a value out of 100. 
Countries with scores of 90, for instance, are very competitive thus having a sophisticated 
business culture supportive for business; conversely the opposite is true for low scoring 
countries. 
 
Size of Informal Economy IE: There are several definitions for Informal Economy, 
however, this paper relies on the one provided by Castells and Portes (1989). Informal Economy 
includes  all the activities generating income that are not regulated by state institutions; some of 
which can be legal or illegal (Castells and Portes, 1989, p.12).  In the informal economy, „trust, 
32  
 
the solidity of social norms and ties of those involved” are the informal institutions that support 
production within it (Portes, 1994, p. 430). Therefore, the size of the informal economy provides 
a proxy for measuring the importance of Informal institutions within a country. For instance as 
the size of the informal economy of a country increase as a percentage of its GDP”, so will the 
degree of influence of the Informal Institutions on the economic activity in that particular 
country. This paper uses Schneider‟s measure of the size of the Informal Economy. The measure 
relies on the burden of taxation, social security contribution and government regulation 
(Schneider, 2002). 
The average of these four indices represents the degree of influence of informal 
institutions within an institutional environment which is called Informal index in this study. With 
the use of this average, this study seeks to better understand the average influence that informal 
institutions have on the MNE‟s entry strategy. 
After measuring Formal and Informal aspects of institutional environments, three other 
new variables were computed: Formal over Informal (FOI), Informal over Informal (IOF), and 
Difference between formal and informal over sum of them (DOT). These variables are defined as 
follows: 
FOI measures the degree of formality with respect to the degree of informality of an institutional 
environment. It is computed by dividing the formal index over the informal index. This variable 
will be particularly useful in validating hypothesis 1 
IOF measures the degree of informality with respect to the degree of formality of an institutional 
environment. It is computed by dividing the informal index over the formal index. This variable 
will be particularly useful in validating hypothesis 3 
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DOT measures the combined influence of formal and informal institutions on the behavior of 
firms. DOT is computed as the difference of the formal index and the informal index over the 
sum of these indices. This will be particularly useful for validating hypothesis 2 and 4. 
 
3.3 Data Analysis 
 
This paper uses a multinomial logistic regression model (M-Logit) that estimates the 
effect of the independent variables on the probability (differential odds) that one of the four 
specified strategies is chosen by an MNE.  
 Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the study, including the means and the 
standard deviation of the three independent variables. Table 3 represents the correlations 










Correlations among Acquisition, JV, SA, Greenfield, FOI, IOF and DOT 
Pearson Correlations Coefficients, N=213 
  Acquisition JV SA Greenfield 
FOI 0.13553* (0.2802)** 0.18523** (0.00385) 
Correlation Sig. 2-tailed 0.04820  <0.0001 0.00670  0.95550  
IOF (0.02138) 0.13522* (0.14862)* (0.00744) 
Correlation Sig. 2-tailed 0.75630  0.04870  0.03010  0.91400  
DOT 0.10652  (0.25325)** 0.19156** (0.00618) 
Correlation Sig. 2-tailed 0.12120  0.00020  0.00500  0.92860  
Note: *p<0.05;**p<0.01 
 
Looking at the correlation matrices, we can see clearly see that the results will not allow 
draw conclusions on the Greenfield mode of entry.  In the case of FOI and its correlation with 
the other dependent variables we can observe the followings: 
 There is a significant positive correlation between FOI and Acquisition which suggest 
a positive relationship between formality and Acquisition. 
 There is a significant negative correlation between FOI and JV, and there is a positive 
correlation between FOI and SA. These correlations suggest a negative relationship 
between formality and JV, but a positive one with SA. 
From the correlation coefficients between IOF and JV and SA we can observe the 
followings:  
 There is a significant positive correlation between IOF and JV. This result suggests a 
positive relationship between informality and JV.  
 There is a significant negative correlation coefficient between IOF and SA. This 
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result suggests a positive relationship between informality and SA.  
 There is a negative correlation between DOT and JV. This suggests a relationship 
between the combined influences of formal and informal institutions and JV. There is 
a positive correlation coefficient between DOT and SA. This suggests a positive 





 Table 4 provides the summary of the multinomial logistic regression analysis. The 
likelihood ratio statistics of each model in the three regressions are significant, this means that 
the models are valid and that at least one of the coefficients is not equal to zero. The high p-value 
(p>0.05) suggests a good fit between the model and the data.  
The coefficients calculated in the table represent the differential odds of a particular 
outcome of the dependent compared to those of the reference outcome of the dependent variable. 









Regressions 1, 2 and 3 
    Model Significance 
Regression 1 Likelihood Ratio DF=123 Chi-Square=140.3 Pr>ChiDq=0.1334* 
    Coefficient Significance 
    Coefficient Chi-Square Pr>ChiDq 
FOI JV vs. Acquisition (0.5418)** 11.51 0.0007 
        
    Model Significance 
Regression 2 Likelihood Ratio DF=123 Chi-Square=148.58 Pr>ChiDq=0.1158* 
    Coefficient Significance 
IOF 
  Coefficient Chi-Square Pr>ChiDq 
Acquisition vs. SA 2.4686* 5.36 0.0206 
JV vs. SA 2.8603** 7.07 0.0078 
      
    Model Significance 
Regression 3 Likelihood Ratio DF=123 Chi-Square=142.00 Pr>ChiDq=0.0580* 
    Coefficient Significance 
    Coefficient Chi-Square Pr>ChiDq 
DOT Acquisition vs. JV 1.7845** 8.29 0.004 
  SA vs. JV 4.3607** 10.92 0.001 
     
Note: *p<0.05;**p<0.01   
   
In the first regression, the number in the coefficient column represents the differential 
odds of an MNE choosing JV over Acquisition as an entry strategy. The negative sign on the 
coefficient means that as the degree of formality in the institutional environment increases, 
MNEs are less likely to choose JV over Acquisition as a mode of entry. This result partially 
supports hypothesis 1 in the sense that as the degree of formality of an institutional environment 
increases so does the likelihood of MNEs choosing Acquisitions over JV. 
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In the second regression there are two significant positive coefficients (p<0.05). The 
differential odds of an MNE choosing Acquisition and JV as an entry strategies over SA are both 
positive. This means as the influence of informal institutions increase with respect to formal 
institutions firms are more likely to choose Acquisition and Joint Venture as a mode of entry 
over Strategic Alliance. This result partially contradicts hypothesis 3. 
In the third and final regression, there are two significant positive coefficient (p<0.05). 
The differential odds of an MNE choosing Acquisition and SA as an entry strategies over JV are 
both positive. This means that as the influence of both informal and formal institutions increase 
firms are more likely to choose Acquisition and Strategic alliance as a mode of entry over Joint 
Ventures. These results partially confirm hypothesis 1 but partially disconfirm hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 1 states that as the degree of formality of the institutional environment increases, in 
this case as the DOT increases Acquisition is more likely to happen than JV.  The result partially 
disconfirms hypothesis 3 because the results do not support a relationship between informality 
and SA. 
However, as the difference is reduced, this means that as the degree of influence of both 
institutions increases, Joint Venture is more likely to occur than the other two entry strategies 
which confirms hypothesis 2. This latest case supports hypothesis 2 which establishes a 





4.  Discussion and Conclusion 
4.1 Discussion  
 
 The results of this study partially support Hypotheses 1 and 2. In Hypothesis 1, it is 
suggested that there is a positive relationship between formality and Acquisition. The correlation 
coefficient between FOI and Acquisition suggests a positive relationship between the degree of 
formality of an institutional environment and Acquisition as an entry strategy. Looking at the 
result of the first regression and the third regression in Table IV, the results partially confirm that 
is preferred over Joint Venture where formality is more influential.  
 Hypothesis 2 suggests that there is a relationship between choosing JV and the high 
degrees formality and informality of an institutional environment. The results here again partially 
confirm this Hypothesis. In table III, the positive correlation between IOF and JV suggest a 
relationship between informality and JV, but more importantly the negative correlation DOT and 
JV seems to suggest that the combination of the formal and informal characteristics have a 
positive impact on JV. The results in table IV are mixed with respect to JV. The results from the 
third regression show two things. First, as the degree of formality in an institutional environment 
increases Acquisition and SA are more likely to occur. This partially contradicts Hypothesis 3. 
Second, as the DOT decreases, entering through JVs are more likely to occur compared to 
Acquisition and SA. This means that as both formality and informality of an institutional 
environment of a country become stronger, the likelihood of JV for entering this country will 
increase. This partially supports Hypothesis 2. 
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 The results in tables III and IV are more problematic when dealing with Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 3 predicts a relationship between high informality and SA. The positive correlation 
between FOI and SA, and the negative correlation between IOF and SA seem to disconfirm 
Hypothesis 3. The second regression finds similar results. In the second regression, the 
differential odds show that as the degree of influence of informal institutions increases, 
Acquisition and JV are more likely to occur more than SA. This partially disconfirms Hypothesis 
3. This lack of finding support for Hypothesis 3 can be a result of focusing on OECD countries 
in the selected sample for the study. 
 With respect to Hypothesis 4, the results are not significant as shown in Table III all three 
correlation coefficients are not significant. The coefficients between any of the entry strategies 
and Greenfield are also not significant. The results make it impossible to draw conclusions on the 
relationship between the characteristics of the institutional environment and Greenfield mode of 
entry. 
 This study therefore concludes that, as predicted, there is partial evidence of a positive 
relationship between the degree of formality of an institutional environment and Acquisition over 
JV. This result is consistent with others studies on this topic (e.g. Meyer et al., 2008). The second 
empirical evidence provided by this study is that there is a positive relationship between JV and 
the high degree of influence of formal and informal institutions in a country. This result is 
consistent with other studies on the same topic (e.g. Yiu and Makino, 2002). It is interesting to 
notify that this study clearly shows that it is the combination of both formal and informal 
institutions that affect entry modes. This result is consistent with Yiu and Makino (2002) 





The study has major theoretical, empirical and practical contributions.  Theoretically, this 
study argues that formal/informal characteristics of host countries‟ institutional environments 
explain the variations of MNEs‟ international behavior. Another theoretical contribution of this 
study is that it shows how Institutional theory complements the Transaction Cost theory and 
Resource-based view in explaining MNEs‟ entry strategies. 
Empirically, this provides evidence for the relationship between entry strategy of MNEs 
and the extent to which the host country‟s institutional environment is driven by formal 
and/informal institutions.  The theoretical framework used to test the hypotheses has rarely been 
used in the literature (Canabal and White, 2008; Meyer et al., 2008; Yiu and Makino, 2002).  
Furthermore, the results from this study are consistent with the results of others studies in the 
field that have combined other perspectives to test their hypotheses (Yiu and Makino 2002; 
Meyer et al., 2008).  This study makes a small methodological contribution by introducing the 
variable sophistication of business culture (BC). This variable is broader than others measures of 
culture used by authors such as Yiu and Makino (2002), who rely on variables such as 
Ethnocentricity and Cultural distance to measure the impact of culture on the entry strategy of 
MNEs.  
In practice, this study offers managers concrete examples taken from the non-alcoholic 





4. 3 Limitations and further research 
 
 There are theoretical and empirical limitations to this study. The first limitation is the fact 
that the study assumed all firms had a constant level of internal legitimacy which cannot be true 
in reality. Indeed MNEs must deal with the internal and external legitimacy which vary across 
MNEs (Zaheer and Kostova, 1999). Further research should be conducted to better understand 
how firms with different internal legitimacy requirements my change the effect of institutional 
environments on entry strategy of MNEs.  
Empirically, this study only considered firms originating from high income OECD 
countries which can give skewed results. The results of the study establish a positive relationship 
between high formality and SA over Acquisition and JV, which disconfirms Hypothesis 3. 
However, Transaction cost theory has already established a relationship between high formality 
and Strategic Alliance when firms do not seek to own their foreign venture (Anderson and 
Gatignon, 1986).  Furthermore in the sample used for the study, most of the transactions 
involving SA were done in countries that have a certain degree of influence formal institutions in 
their environment that facilitate the formation of strategic alliances between local and MNEs. 
Indeed SDC relies heavily on the data provided by national stock exchanges which in turn rely 
on a relatively important set of market supportive formal institutions. Had the sample been 
extended to other non high income OECD country, the results could support hypothesis 3. 
Further research should look to broaden the scope of countries involved in order to better capture 
the variation of the impact of the degree of formal and informal institutions on multinational 
firms from all over the world.  
The third limitation has to do with the lack of control variables in the study. This study 
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attempts to control for industry effect, product effect, and finally the effect of country of origin 
through its sampling procedure.  It controls for industry effect by focusing solely on the 
beverages industry as a manufacturing industry. It also controls for the type of products by 
focusing on non-alcoholic beverages. Firms from the non-alcoholic beverages industry produces 
very standardized products which require only minimal adaptation of their product to local 
markets. Finally, it controls for the country of origin effect by only considering firms originating 
from high income OECD countries, so that they only focus on growth.  
   However, there are other variables such as firm size, firm age and/or experience, and 
even firm ownership that can moderate the relationship between institutional effects and entry 
strategies. Controlling for these kinds of firm level variables might change the results. Further 
research should also investigate the impact of for example firm size and experience on mode of 
entry with various combinations of formal and informal institutional effects. The same can be 




 In conclusion, this study examines the impact of two characteristics – formal and 
informal – of various institutional environments and their combinations on the international 
behavior of MNEs. Indeed, this study demonstrates the relationship between formal 
characteristic of an institutional environment and Acquisition as an entry strategy. It also 
demonstrates the relationship that exists between the combination of formal and informal 
characteristics and JV. These results are valid in 43 countries around the World. In addition, this 
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study responds to the calls from scholars to further enhance our knowledge on the influences of 
institutions on modes of entry, while acknowledging the important results derived from 
Transaction Cost theory and Resource-based view. All in all, this study argues that research 
should pay as much attention on the fact that the car is on the streets of Kampala, as the 
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Venture Greenfield Acquisition 
Grand 
Total 
ARGENTINA   2     2 
AUSTRALIA 2 2  1 5 
AUSTRIA     1 1 
BELGIUM   1  1 2 
BRAZIL 1 4 1 8 14 
BULGARIA   1   1 
CANADA 5 1  11 17 
CHILE   4   4 
CHINA   9  1 10 
CZECH REPUBLIC   1  1 2 
DENMARK     1 1 
EGYPT   2   2 
FINLAND   1  2 3 
FRANCE 1 1  8 10 
GERMANY     4 4 
GREECE     1 1 
HUNGARY 1 2  6 9 
INDIA   3 1 1 5 
INDONESIA     1 1 
ISRAEL   1   1 
ITALY     3 3 
JAPAN 3 3 1  7 
JORDAN     1 1 
MALAYSIA 1   1 2 
MEXICO 1 2  4 7 
NETHERLANDS     2 2 
NEW ZEALAND    1 2 3 
PERU 1 1  3 5 
PHILIPPINES   4  1 5 
POLAND   1 1 3 5 
RUSSIAN FED   1  4 5 
SINGAPORE   1  1 2 
SOUTH AFRICA     1 1 
SOUTH KOREA   1  1 2 
SPAIN   3  1 4 
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SWEDEN     2 2 
SWITZERLAND   3  5 8 
THAILAND   3  1 4 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 2   10 12 
UNITED STATES 12 7  12 31 
VENEZUELA   1   1 
VIETNAM   4  1 5 
ZIMBABWE     1 1 






















Appendix 2:  MNEs and Entry Strategy 
 








National Foods Ltd Australia   1     1 
Chaudfontaine 
Monopole SA 
Belgium 1       1 
SEA Holdings SA Belgium   1     1 
Sepef Corp Belgium   1     1 
Beverage Holdings Ltd Canada 2       2 
Brio Industries Inc Canada 1       1 
Cleraly Canadian 
Beverage 
Canada       1 1 
Cott Beverages Inc Canada 1       1 
Cott Corp Canada 4 2     6 
Iceberg Corp of America Canada   1     1 
Leading Brands Inc Canada   1     1 
Lifestyles NA Beverage 
Corp 
Canada 1       1 
Peterborough Capital 
Corp 
Canada 1       1 
Sparkling Spring Water 
Ltd 
Canada 3       3 
Stonepoint Group Ltd Canada 2 1     3 
CO-RO Food A/S Denmark 1       1 
Groupe Danone SA France 1 7 1 3 12 
Perrier-Vittel SA France 12 9 0 0 21 
Societe des Eaux 
Minerales de 
France   1     1 
Eckes-Granini 
Deutschland GmbH 
Germany 3 2     5 
Sinter Umwelttechnik Germany   1     1 
Greece`s Co-operative 
Union 
Greece   1     1 
Hellenic Bottling Co SA Greece 2       2 
Eden Springs Ltd Israel 4 2     6 
Mey Eden Israel 1       1 
Soda Club Group Israel 3       3 
Asatsu DK Inc  Japan   1     1 
Kirin Beverage Corp Japan   1     1 
Pokka Corp Japan   1   1 2 
East Springs 
International 
Netherlands 1       1 
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Refresco Holding BV Netherlands 2       2 
Hoop SA Poland   1     1 
Sumoiis-Cia Industrias de Portugal   1     1 
Equatorial  Coca-Cola 
Bottling 
Spain 1       1 
Aqua of Sweden AB Sweden 1       1 
Nestle Co Inc Switzerland 3 2   6 11 




  1     1 
Cabri Spring Water United 
Kigdom 
      1 1 
Four Square United 
Kingdom 





1       1 
Virgin Drinks United 
Kingdom 
  1     1 
Aetna International Inc United 
States 
  1     1 
American Botling Co United 
States 
      1 1 
Beverage Group Inc United 
States 





1     1 2 
Buffalo Rock Co United 
States 
      1 1 
Coca-Cola  United 
States 
25 20 3 9 57 
Cosmos Bottling Corp United 
States 
  1     1 
Eastern Water Resources United 
States 
  1     1 
Monsanto  United 
States 





4 1     5 
PepsiCo Inc United 
States 





1       1 




      1 1 
Stearns & Lehman Inc United 
States 
1       1 








1       1 
Whitman Corp United 
States 
1       1 
WTAA International Inc United 
States 
      1 1 
Groceries USA United 
States 
  1     1 
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Regression 3 
 
 
 
